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The Elusive Search for Values in
Constitutional
Interpretation
by ARTHUR S. MILLER*
Introduction
How and by whom should a written constitution be interpreted?
For nearly two centuries these questions have stirred debate in the
United States, a debate at times enlightening, at times polemical, and at
time merely choleric. Raoul Berger, who a decade ago maintained that
judicial review, although not mentioned in the Constitution, was never-
theless constitutionally permissible,' has now in Government by Judici-
ary2 decided that the federal courts, and particularly the Supreme
Court, have gone too far in interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment.
Berger concentrates on two Warren Court decisions, Brown v.
Board of Education,l the 1954 landmark school desegregation decision,
and Reynolds v. Sims,4 the 1964 reapportionment decision mandating
"one person/one vote" in apportionment of state legislatures, but he
casts his net far wider. He asserts that much of the Supreme Court's
exegesis of the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment5 amounts to
an unconstitutional exercise of raw power by the Justices because
neither racial desegregation nor equal suffrage was contemplated by its
framers. As the principal technique of constitutional interpretation,
* Professor of Law Emeritus, The George Washington University. The research
assistance of Carl Gulliver is gratefully acknowledged.
1. R. BERGER, CONGRESS V. THE SUPREME COURT (1969).
2. R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOUR-
TEENTH AMENDMENT (1977) [hereinafter cited as GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY].
3. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
4. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
5. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I. Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment provides
that: "All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall
make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws."
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Berger would have the Court search for and ascertain the intentions of
those in the thirty-ninth Congress who drafted the Fourteenth Amend-
ment; once found, those intentions are to be rigorously followed.6 To
facilitate this process, Government by Judiciary focuses on the debates
in the thirty-ninth Congress as the best evidence of that intent.7
In essence, Berger's position treats the Constitution like any other
written instrument-a contract, a will, a conveyance, a statute-and
views the Supreme Court as an ordinary court of law. He repeatedly
refers to commonly accepted canons of interpretation as if such a fixed,
reliable body of decisional principles existed and could be applied to
the Constitution.8 In fact, the Constitution, as Woodrow Wilson
phrased it, "is not a mere lawyers' document. . . . [I]t is. . .the vehi-
cle of a nation's life."9 By focusing solely on the Framers' intent, Ber-
ger merely isolates one of many factors to be considered when
interpreting the Constitution.
I believe with Woodrow Wilson that the Constitution is Darwin-
ian, not Newtonian, and that Americans "have married legislation with
adjudication and look for statesmanship in our courts."'" Whether or
not "statesmanship" is always forthcoming from the Justices, the point
remains that the 1787 Constitution, as Professor Sanford Levinson has
said, "is related to today's Constitution only in metaphorical ways."'"
The Constitution is not a document frozen in time; it never has been,
and indeed never can be. Amendment is not the only way the docu-
ment can be changed.'" As Senator Daniel Moynihan recently
6. GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at 3.
7. Id at7.
8. See, e.g., id at 7 n.22, 7-8 n.24, 9 n.26, 17 n.57, 124, 136-37.
9. W. WILSON, CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 157 (1908)
(1961 ed.). Wilson wrote: "No lawyer can read into a document anything subsequent to its
execution; but we have read into the Constitution of the United States the whole expansion
and transformation of our national life that has followed its adoption. ... The explicitly
granted powers of the Constitution are what they always were; but the powers drawn from it
by implication have grown and multiplied beyond all expectation, and each generation of
statesmen looks to the Supreme Court to supply the interpretation which will serve the needs
of the day." Id at 157-58.
10. Id at 168.
11. Levinson, The Specious Morality of the Law, HARPER'S MAGAZINE, May 1977, at
37, 42. Levinson's brief essay is a particularly fertile contribution to the study of American
constitutionalism.
12. For Berger, the sole avenue for divergence from precedent lies m the amendment
process. For example, in his discussion of the desegregation decision, Brown v. Board of
Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), Berger argues that the thirty-ninth Congress, when adopting the
Fourteenth Amendment, did not intend to address the question of desegregation. He con-
cludes that the Brown Court therefore had no constitutional power under the Fourteenth
Amendment to mandate school desegregation. Berger's alternative is constitutional amend-
[Vol. 6.487
ELUSIVE SEARCH FOR VALUES
observed:
Americans, understandably, tend to think of constitutional
change in terms of the amendment process. But this is not the
only way change takes place, as John Marshall demonstrated
when he established that the Supreme Court had the right of ju-
dicial review of acts of Congress. In this sense the American
Constitution can evolve rather in the way the British constitution
is said to evolve, and indeed does.13
As a statement of what has happened, Moynihan's position surely can-
not be gainsaid.
14
Berger, however, is stating what should happen--quite a different
thing. In that, I fear, he recalls to mind the philosopher about whom
Bertrand Russell once wrote: "[He] first invents a false theory as to the
nature of things, and then deduces that wicked actions are those which
show that his theory is false."' 5 Berger does not call for a retreat to the
status quo ante: "It would. . . be utterly unrealistic and probably im-
possible to undo the past in the face of the expectations that the segre-
gation decisions, for example, have aroused in our black citizenry-
expectations confirmed by every decent instinct." 16 "But," he writes,
"to accept thus far accomplished ends is not to condone the continued
employment of the unlawful means. . . .[T]he difficulty of a rollback
cannot excuse the continuation of such unconstitutional practices." 7
I concede, quite cheerfully, that the Justices often invoke what
they claim is the intention of the Founding Fathers, or of those who
drafted the amendments, as a means of explaining or justifying their
decisions. The Black-Frankfurter debate in the Adamson"s case and
Chief Justice Taney's opinion in Dred Scott19 amply document this
ment. "The real issue," Berger writes, was "who was to make the change---the people or the
Justices." GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at 132. This view ignores the dynamics of judicial
interpretation and would have the law bound and tied by stare decisis, whether or not well-
suited to contemporary needs.
13. Moynihan, Imperial Government, 65 COMMENTARY No. 6, at 25, 31 (June 1978).
Moynihan begins his essay with these words: "The question of size and effectiveness in
American government is beginning to take on aspects of constitutional as against merely
political debate." Id at 25. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
14. In accord with Moynihan's view, I think that Berger's theory of constitutional inter-
pretation is surely faulty and probably false, at least to the extent that it has never been
consistently followed by the 101 men who have sat or are sitting on the Supreme Court.
15. B. RUSSELL, SCEPTICAL ESSAYS 91 (1928). For Berger's response to two rather mild
criticisms of his book, see Berger, Academe vs. the Founding Fathers, NATIONAL REVIEW,
April 14, 1978, at 468.
16. GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at 412-13.
17. Id at 413 (emphasis in original).
18. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947).
19. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856). See note 74 infra.
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point. History is often a part of the opinions of the Justices. But that
does not mean that the history invoked is clear, or, of more importance,
that it should control. It is not unknown, furthermore, for the Justices
to see an intention of the Framers where others do not.20 But that, I
suggest, is the result of deep-set institutional reasons, judges not being
ready as, for example, Professor Ray Forrester is, for "truth in
judging.
21
The purpose of this commentary is not to engage in contentious
debate-although that would be easy, for Berger himself admits that
his book has a "polemical tone."'2 2 My purpose is instead to suggest
and develop two basic points: (1) constitutional interpretation is not a
judicial monopoly; and (2) the need is to search for and identify the
values that should be furthered in interpreting the Constitution, rather
than to make a bootless and usually fruitless quest for the intentions of
those who drafted the document and its amendments. Each point will
be taken up in order, but my main effort will be directed toward the
second.
I. The Making of Constitutional Decisions
Who under the Constitution can make decisions of constitutional
dimensions? Since Marbury v. Madison23 was decided in 1803, lawyers
20. E.g., Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895); see C. MILLER,
THE SUPREME COURT AND THE USES OF HISTORY (1969).
21. Forrester, Are We Readyfor Truth in Judging?, 63 A.B.A.J. 1212 (1977).
22. GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at 9. I add at the outset that of course Berger is fully
entitled to his opinion and to expressing it however he wishes. The First Amendment guar-
antees him that, although surely it is meet to note that the protections we all enjoy from
encroachments by state governments on First Amendment freedoms came only through ju-
dicial "incorporation" of that Amendment into the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Although Justice Black believed otherwise, most commentators (and judges)
do not rely on history to justify that bit of judicial lawmaking. For Black's views on this
subject, see Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 68 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting). A useful
essay is Kelly, Clio and the Court: An Illicit Love Affair, 1965 SUP. CT. REV. 119.
The Supreme Court has not overruled Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243 (1833), in so
many words, but has so eroded its foundations that the case is now little more than a seldom
noticed milestone in American constitutional history. Barron established the principle that
the Bill of Rights applied only to actions of the federal government, not to those of the
states.
23. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). It is important to note that Marburt, did not declare a
statute unconstitutional; the Court merely refused to exercise a jurisdiction not constitution-
ally granted to it. The Dred Scott case, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856), discussed at note 74
infra, was the first time the Court held a federal statute unconstitutional. Felix Cohen main-
tains that Louis Boudin "presents at least aprimafacie case for the view that the decision in
Marbury v. Madison was neither intended nor, for many years, understood as an affirmance
of the modem doctrine that final power to interpret the Constitution rests in the conscience
of the judiciary." F. COHEN, THE LEGAL CONSCIENCE 439 (L. Cohen ed. 1960). Cohen's
[Vol. 6:487
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have become accustomed to agreeing that it is the "judicial depart-
ment" whose task it is "to say what the law is."'24 It is true that the
Supreme Court has had the major role in interpreting the fundamental
law. In those interpretations, the Court of course makes law, as Justice
White asserted in Miranda v. Arizona:
25
That the Court's holding today is neither compelled nor
even strongly suggested by the language of the Fifth Amend-
ment, is at odds with American and English legal history, and
involves a departure from a long line of precedent does not prove
either that the Court has exceeded its powers or that the Court is
wrong or unwise in its present reinterpretation of the Fifth
Amendment. It does, however, underscore the obvious-that the
Court has not discovered or found the law in making today's de-
cision, nor has it derived it from some irrefutable sources; what it
has done is to make new law and new public policy in much the
same way that it has in the course of interpreting other great
clauses of the Constitution. This is what the Court historically
has done. Indeed, it is what it must do and will continue to do
until and unless there is some fundamental change in the consti-
tutional distribution of governmental powers.26
To Justice White, "it is wholly legitimate. . to inquire into the advis-
ability of [the Court's decision] in terms of the long-range interest of
the country;" or, as he said later in his dissenting opinion, the Court
has a "duty to assess the consequences of its action." 2 However one
views the actual merits of the Miranda decision, I cannot see how one
can disagree with the historical observations made by Justice White.2 9
Anyone with the power of interpretation "is truly the lawgiver," as
Bishop Hoadley said in 1717.30 Despite Chief Justice Marshall's asser-
tion in Marbury,3 1 quoted by Chief Justice Burger in United States v.
views were expressed in a review of L. Boudin's Government by Judiciary. Cohen, Book
Review, 32 CoLUM. L. REV. 1262 (1932).
24. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
25. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
26. Id at 531 (White, J., dissenting, joined by Harlan & Stewart, JJ.) (footnote omitted).
27. Id
28. Id at 537.
29. What Justice White did not specify is how the Justices are to "assess the conse-
quences" of their decisions, a critical need. Are they, as Justice Frankfurter once said, to
make "blind guesses about those consequences"? F. FRANKFURTER, SOME OBSERVATIONS
ON SUPREME COURT LITIGATION AND LEGAL EDUCATION 17 (1954).
30. Sermon by Bishop Hoadley, King's Court, Mar. 31, 1717, quotedin W. LOCKHART,
Y. KAMISAR, & J. CHOPER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES, COMMENTS & QUESTIONS 1 (4th
ed. 1975).
31. Quoted in text accompanying note 24 supra.
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Nixon,32 it is (at times, at least, and not rarely) "the province and duty"
of the political branches of government "to say what the law is."33
Congressional enactments such as the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890,
34
The Employment Act of 1946,35 the War Powers Resolution of 197336
and the Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 197417 surely have
constitutional dimensions. 38 Of particular significance in light of recent
history is the power asserted by Congress in the War Powers Resolu-
tion of 197331 to establish guidelines for the use of military force other
than in a state of declared war. President Nixon vetoed the bill on
constitutional grounds,40 but Congress overrode the veto and subse-
quently enacted guidelines to limit any future use of armed forces in
foreign hostilities.4' Similarly, Congress has, in the Impoundment
Control Act of 1974,42 imposed substantial restraints on presidential
authority to impound funds appropriated by Congress. The President
has the duty to administer the national budget, yet this Congressional
enactment limits the exercise of that power.
Professor Gerald Gunther has called the War Powers Resolution
and the Impoundment Control Act "quasi-constitutional, '43 but there
is no reason to soften the label with a "quasi." Congress has histori-
32. 418 U.S. 683 (1974) (the first time the writ of the Court ran against the President qua
President).
33. Id at 703 (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). For
examples of congressional and executive law-making, see L. BOUDIN, GOVERNMENT BY JU-
DICIARY (1932).
34. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-11 (1976).
35. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1021-1025 (1976).
36. Pub. L. No. 93-148, 87 Stat. 555 (1973), adopted over Presidential veto Nov. 7, 1973.
37. 31 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1353 (1976).
38. The Sherman Act itself has all the attributes of a constitutional provision. The origi-
nal statute and its exegesis by the Court provide a close analogy to "pure" constitutional
cases. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911); Northern Sec. Co. v. United
States, 193 U.S. 197 (1904); Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211 (1899);
United States v. E. C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895).
39. Pub. L. No. 93-148, 87 Stat. 555 (1973).
40. See H. R. Doc. No. 93-171, 93d Cong., Ist Sess. (1973).
41. See note 36 supra. The controversy out of which the resolution arose involved the
question of whether legal justification existed for the use of military force in the Vietnam
conflict absent a formal declaration of war by Congress. The Supreme Court consistently
denied certiorari in cases seeking a judicial determination as to the constitutionality of the
Vietnam conflict. See, e.g., dissents by Justices Stewart and Douglas to the denial of certio-
rari in Mora v. McNamara, 389 U.S. 934 (1967). See also G. GUNTHER, C SES AND MATER-
IALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 427-29 (9th ed. 1975) [hereinafter cited as GUNTHER].
42. 31 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1353 (1976).
43. GUNTHER, supra note 41, at 429 n.3. Gunther writes of the Impoundment Control
Act: "That Act-like the War Powers Resolution of 1973. . .represents congressional ac-
tion of an unusual and especially important nature. Instead of congressional directives re-
garding substantive governmental policies, it delineates structures and processes. It is
[Vol. 6:487
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cally and continues in the present to formulate statutes of constitutional
dimension, carrying out roles in the exercise of its express powers that
were not contemplated by the Framers. So, too, with the President;
possibly the outstanding example of this is the Chief Executive's exer-
cise of his duty as Commander-in-Chief, and his assertion of "consti-
tutional reason of state"-the power of the President to take action in
emergency situations.' This power has been repeatedly asserted from
Lincoln's time until the Mayaquez incident' 5-in sharp contrast to the
explicit delegation to Congress of the power to "declare war.""
Other examples could be given, for both Congress and the Chief
Executive, but they need not be needlessly multiplied. The point is
clear: constitutional interpretation is not a monopoly of the judges. To
say this, however, is not to answer the question of where in the consti-
tutional scheme the ultimate power of interpretation is lodged. The
Court has claimed this role for itself. "We are not final because we are
infallible," observed Justice Jackson, "but we are infallible only be-
cause we are final."'47 Justice Jackson's observation is true enough, so
far as it goes, but how far does it really go? Despite De Tocqueville's
well-known aphorism that "scarcely any political question arises in the
United States that is not resolved, sooner or later, into a judicial ques-
tion,"4 effective control over many decisions of constitutional dimen-
sion lies elsewhere than in the Supreme Court-in Congress, in the
President and even in the bureaucracy.4 9 When the additional factor of
legislation that can be viewed as quasi-constitutional in nature, for it seeks to clarify and
define basic relationships among the branches of government." Id at 416.
44. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2 provides that: "The President shall be Commander in Chief
of the Army and Navy of the United States." See generally A. MILLER, PRESIDENTIAL
POWER IN A NUTSHELL 162-228 (1977).
45. See id at 211-13. Lincoln used the Commander-in-Chief clause to justify defensive
blockades in the Civil War. See The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 668-70 (1863).
Another example is the presidential removal of Japanese-Americans from the West Coast
during World War II. See Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943), upholding Exec.
Order No. 9066, 7 Fed. Reg. 1407 (1942), as ratfed by Congress, Pub. L. No. 503, 56 Stat.
173 (1942). On the war making power, see generally Berger, War-Making By the President,
121 U. PA. L. REv. 29 (1972); Lofgren, War-Making Under the Constitution: The Original
Understanding, 81 YALE L.J. 672 (1972); Van Alstyne, Congress, the President, andthe Power
to Declare War. A Requiemfor Vietnam, 121 U. PA. L. REv. 1 (1972). For specific discus-
sions of the Mayaguez incident, see Kelley, The Constitutional Implications of the Mayaguez
Incident, 3 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 301 (1976); Paust, The Seizure andRecovery ofthe Maya-
guez, 85 YALE L.J. 774 (1976).
46. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
47. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443,540 (1953). See also notes 61 & 62 and accompanying
text infra.
48. A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 280 (1956 ed.).
49. For a view of the increasing complexity of all aspects of government and its corre-
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compliance with Court decisions by public officials and the people gen-
erally is considered, one finds that the purported finality of judicial de-
cisions is quite often something very different from the theory
presented to students of law and government.
We know very little about the impact of judicial decisions; impact
is, generally speaking, terra incognita in constitutional scholarship. 0
Even an impressionistic glance, however, quickly reveals that the pat-
tern of compliance is uneven. Consider for example, Brown5 and
-Reynolds,52 the cases about which Berger is most concerned: the latter
has been followed to a large extent, but a quarter-century after Brown
the struggle still continues over the civil fights of the black commu-
nity.53 There is an eroding commitment to decent treatment under the
Constitution for blacks, as well as for other disadvantaged elements of
our society. 4 The point need not be belabored: the Supreme Court is
not the only constitutional interpreter and, when it does interpret, its
view, although the last word, is not necessarily final. Furthermore, the
sponding impact on our governmental functions, see Wilson, The Rise of the Bureaucratic
State, 41 PuB. INTEREST 77 (1975).
50. See T. BECKER, THE IMPACT OF SUPREME COURT DECISIONS: EMPIRICAL STUDIES
(1969); L. BOUDIN, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY (1932); WASBY, THE IMPACT OF THE
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT (1970); Miller, On the Needfor "Impact Analysis" of
Supreme Court Decisions, 53 GEO. L.J. 365 (1965), reprinted in A. MILLER, THE SUPREME
COURT: MYTH AND REALITY at ch. 7 (1968) [hereinafter cited as MILLER, THE SUPREME
COURT]; Miller & Scheflin, Thei- ower ofthe Supreme Court in the Age of the Positive State:.A
Preliminary Excursus, 1967 DUKE L.J. 273, 522, reprinted in MILLER, THE SUPREME COURT,
supra at ch. 6.
51. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
52. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
53. Compliance with Brown has been partial at best. In the 1964-65 school year, statis-
tics revealed that only 2.14% of black students in the eleven "southern states" attended
schools in which they were not the racial maj6rity. In September 1968, the figure was re-
ported at 20.3%. By the 1972-73 school year, it was 46.3%. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE
UNITED STATES 124 (1974). The comparative figure for 1972-73 in the six "border states and
the District of Columbia" was 31.8%; in the 32 "northern and western states" it was 28.3%.
Id
54. To illustrate, one need only mention the half-hearted implementation of Brown's
desegregation mandate in areas outside education by some of the southern federal judiciary.
See Vines, Federal District Judges and Race Relations in the South, 26 J. OF POL. 337-57
(May 1964), reprinted in T. BECKER, THE IMPACT OF SUPREME COURT DECISIONS 76-87
(1969). Vines analyzes all race relation cases decided in the federal district courts of the
eleven southern states from May 1954 to October 1962. He finds a pattern of compliance
with Brown that varies according to such factors as the political background of judges and
the black population of the district. See also McKay, "With all Deliberate Speed': A Study of
School Desegregation, 31 N.Y.U.L. REv. 991-1090 (1956); Miller & Howell, The Myth of
Neutraliy in Constitutional Adjudication, 27 U. CHI. L. REV. 661, 676-77 and cases cited at
677 nn. 64-66 (1960), reprinted in MILLER, THE SUPREME COURT, supra note 50, at ch. 3.
[Vol 6:487
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very legitimacy of the character of some of the Court's recent deci-
sion-making is far from settled.
In such decisions as Cooper v. Aaron,55 Roe v. Wade,56 Miranda v.
Arizona," and Green v. County School Board," the Justices stated not
a specific norm aimed only at the parties before the bench (or the class
they represented), but a "general norm" purporting to bind all people.
The difference is between "the law of the case" and "the law of the
land;" this difficult jurisprudential question, not mentioned by Berger,
is one of the unsolved problems of constitutional adjudication. If one
agrees with Berger that Marbury v. Madison59 was correctly decided,
that only means that the Court decided the merits of the case for Mr.
Marbury.60 The Court in Cooper, however, maintained that Marbury
established "the basic principle that the federal judiciary is supreme in
the exposition of the law of the Constitution." 61 The Court thus as-
serted that it was the final arbiter of the meaning of the Constitution,
and further, that its decisions in the Brown cases were "the law of the
land"62--something quite different than the "law of the case." The Roe
55. 358 U.S. 1 (1958), wherein the Court reinstated the desegregation plan for Little
Rock, Arkansas approved by the district court in Aaron v. Cooper, 143 F. Supp. 855 (E.D.
Ark. 1956). The Arkansas legislation had sought and won a stay in enforcement of the plan,
163 F. Supp. 13 (E.D. Ark. 1958), believing that Brown was unconstitutional. The Court in
Cooper took the opportunity to emphasize "basic constitutional principles," reiterating Mar-
bury's declaration that" 'it is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department
to say what the law is."' 358 U.S. at 18. Furthermore, the Court observed that the fiat of a
state governor, not the Constitution, would be the supreme law of the land if state legislators
and executives were free to ignore the interpretations of the Constitution rendered by federal
courts. Id at 17-20.
56. 410 U.S. 113 (1973), wherein the Court held that under the equal protection clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment, state legislatures may not impose unduly burdensome re-
strictions on a woman's decision to obtain an abortion during the first trimester of her preg-
nancy, although abortion may be prohibited during the last trimester.
57. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). The Court in Miranda held that the Fifth Amendment privi-
lege against self-incrimination dictates exclusion of any confession or statements obtained
from a suspect in police custody if the suspect has not been informed of his right to remain
silent and that he is entitled to counsel.
58. 391 U.S. 430 (1968). The Court held a school desegregation plan which utilized a
"freedom of choice" option that resulted, after three years, in no white child choosing to go
to the school attended by 85% of the black students inconsistent with Brown v. Board of
Educ. (II), 349 U.S. 294 (1955), and directed the Board to formulate a new plan.
59. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
60. R. BERGER, CONGRESS V. THE SUPREME COURT (1969).
61. 358 U.S. at 18. I have found no previous case in which the Justices made such a
sweeping claim. "It follows," the Court continued, "that the interpretation of the Fourteenth
Amendment enunciated by this Court in the Brown case is the supreme law of the land, and
Art. VI of the Constitution makes it of binding effect on the States 'any Thing in the Consti-
tution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding."' id
62. See id at 17-20. All state activity, the Court noted, "must be exercised consistently
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and Miranda decisions also have all the appearances of legislation. At
the very least, they are "backdoor advisory opinions"63 designed to set-
tle not only "the law of the case" but untold other cases from the entire
nation. Save for a few exceptions, constitutional scholars have not tack-
led the problem of the legitimacy of the Court's articulating general
norms.6 4 Had Berger done so, his book would have been a more valua-
ble addition to the literature.
II. Criteria for Constitutional Interpretation
Never resolved, either in the fundamental law or American his-
tory, is the conffict between popular sovereignty and a written constitu-
tion. They are twin ideals, and it is the tension between them that has
led to the importance of judicial review.65 Also left unanswered is the
question of the guidelines that should be followed in Supreme Court
lawmaking. Put another way, what values should the Justices seek to
further? Here, one should distinguish between the "is" and the
"ought." The "is" may be simply stated: the Justices have used a
number of standards of judgment and have never felt bound to any one
technique.66
The "ought" is something different-far more complex and far
more difficult. Constitutional adjudication requires a teleology as well
as adherence to proper procedure. Berger, however, hews steadily to
the line that the original understanding or intentions of the framers are
the sole proper criterion of judgment. This historical literalism fails to
with federal constitutional requirements as they apply to state action .... The right of a
student not to be segregated on racial grounds in schools so maintained is indeed so funda-
mental and pervasive that it is embraced in the concept of due process of law ... The
principles announced in that decision [Brown] and the obedience of the States to them, ac-
cording to the command of the Constitution, are indispensable for the protection of the
freedoms guaranteed by our fundamental charter for all of us." Id at 19-20.
63. My colleague Jerome Barron and I so characterized them in Miller & Barron, The
Supreme Court, the Adversary System, and the Flow of Information to the Justices: A Prelimi-
nary Inquiry, 61 VA. L. REv. 1187 (1975), reprintedin MILLER, THE SUPREME COURT, supra
note 50, at ch. 8.
64. For one example of a scholar's attempt to address this question, see P. KURLAND,
POLITICS, THE CONSTITUTION, AND THE WARREN COURT (1970): "In Cooper v. Aaron, the
Court seemed to assume the same scope for its decision as the statute could claim." Id at
185.
65. See R. MCCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT (1960).
66. It is instructive to compare the technique of Chief Justice Marshall in Marbury v.
Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), with that utilized in McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S.
(4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). In the former, he treated the Constitution as any ordinary written
legal instrument; sixteen years later in AcCulloch, he maintained that the justices should
never forget that they were expounding a Constitution. Marshall was typical, not unique, in
varying his technique to suit the case at bar.
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offer any positive framework for determining what overriding values
there are or should be. But history is at best an uncertain muse, as
Professors Kammen and Kelly have shown.67 The words of Thomas
Jefferson are instructive in this regard:
Some men look at constitutions with sanctimonious reverence,
and deem them like the ark of the covenant, too sacred to be
touched. They ascribe to the men of the preceding age a wisdom
more than human, and suppose what they did to be beyond
amendment. I knew this age well; I belonged to it, and labored
with it. It deserved well of its country. It was very like the pres-
ent, but without the experience of the present; and forty years of
experience in government is worth a century of book-reading;
and this they would say themselves, were they to rise from the
dead.68
Both Justice Holmes and Chief Justice Hughes repudiated Berger's
view that the framers' intention is the sole proper criterion. 69 The ques-
67. M. KAMMEN, PEOPLE OF PARADOX (1972); Kelly, Clio andthe Court:.An Illicit Love
Affair, 1965 Sup. CT. REv. 119.
68. Words of Thomas Jefferson, quotedin W. DOUGLAS, STARE DECISiS 31 (1949). That
passage from Jefferson should be pondered well by those who take an antiquarian view of
constitutional interpretation. Professor Kammen makes much the same point: "There is an
awkward anomaly in American thought. Although the founders were themselves engaged in
a continuous quest for modes of legitimacy appropriate to their times and needs, subsequent
Americans have sought to validate their own aspirations by invoking the innovations and
standards of our hallowed pantheon as unchanging verities. This nostalgic vision of the
Golden Age actually conjures up an era when values were unclearly defined, when instabil-
ity often seemed beyond control, when public rancor and private vituperation were rampant,
and institutions frail and unformed." M. KAMMEN, PEOPLE OF PARADOX 56 (1973 paper-
back ed.).
69. See Justice Holmes' comments in Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920), and
Chief Justice Hughes' remarks in Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398
(1934). Holland upheld the Migratory Bird Treaty Act as a valid exercise of federal power
which was not unconstitutional as an interference with the rights reserved to the states under
the Tenth Amendment. Justice Holmes stated: "The case before us must be considered in the
light of our whole experience and not merely in that of what was said a hundred years ago."
252 U.S. at 433.
Blaisdell upheld the Minnesota Mortgage Moratorium Law of 1933 against the claim
that the law interfered with freedom of contract. Chief Justice Hughes held: "It is no answer
to say that this public need was not apprehended a century ago, or to insist that what the
provision of the Constitution meant to the vision of that day it must mean to the vision of
our time. If by the statement that what the Constitution meant at the time of its adoption it
means today, it is intended to say that the great clauses of the Constitution must be confined
to the interpretation which the framers, with the conditions and outlook of their time, would
have placed upon them, the statement carries its own refutation." 290 U.S. at 442-43.
Compare the views of Holmes and Hughes with Justice Sutherland's dissent in Blair-
dell, which anticipated Berger's position on constitutional interpretation: "The provisions of
the Federal Constitution, undoubtedly, are pliable in the sense that in appropriate cases they
have the capacity of bringing within their grasp every new condition which falls within their
meaning. But, their meaning is changeless; it is only their application which is extensible."
290 U.S. at 451 (Sutherland, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original). Justice Sutherland contin-
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tion remains as to what standards should be used. What are the values
to be furthered through constitutional adjudication? The following dis-
cussion is, of necessity, brief, more conclusory than comprehensive.
The pretense for many decades was that judges merely found, they
did not make the law, a view derided by Morris R. Cohen as the "pho-
nograph" theory of justice.70 Perhaps the classic statement came from
Chief Justice Marshall:
Courts are the mere instruments of the law, and can will nothing.
When they are said to exercise a discretion, it is a mere legal
discretion, a discretion to be exercised in discerning the course
prescribed by law; and, when that is discerned, it is the duty of
the Court to follow it. Judicial power is never exercised for the
purpose of giving effect to the will of the Judge; always for the
purpose of giving effect to the will of the Legislature- or, in other
words, to the will of the law.
71
That is a nice sentiment, were it true, but it is not. Judges make law,
they always have and always will; any case that reaches the stature of a
ruling on the merits involves the "principle of doctrinal polarity."7 2 In
our adversary system where attorneys represent the opposing view-
points of private parties to a controversy, at least two principles of
equal, or approximately equal, persuasion can be and are produced by
counsel; it is the choice between those principles that makes adjudica-
tion a creative act. That choice is not made, today or yesterday, by
searching in a heaven of legal concepts for the one true principle. Nor
is it usually made by determining the intention of the framers; fidelity
to the Constitution does not require that cases be decided "in accord-
ance with the specific intentions of the framers" 73 -even when those
intentions are ascertainable, which usually they are not. Strict adher-
ence to such a theory can lead the Court and the nation into unwisely
rigid postures, as the Dred Scott decision demonstrates. 74
ued: "The whole aim of construction, as applied to a provision of the Constitution, is to
discover the meaning, to ascertain and give effect to the intent of its framers and the people
who adopted it." Id at 453.
70. M. COHEN, LAW AND THE SOCIAL ORDER 380-81 n.86 (1933) (collection of essays).
71. Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 866 (1824). For a brief
comment on that statement, see B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 169-
70 (1921).
72. For a brief discussion of this concept, see MILLER, THE SUPREME COURT, supra
note 50, at 115-17.
73. Munzer & Nickel, Does the Constitution Mean What It Always Meant?, 77 COLUM.
L. REv. 1029, 1054 (1977).
74. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). By strictly following the intentions of the Framers in
Dred Scott, Chief Justice Taney inflicted what probably is the most grievous wound the
Court has ever suffered. It took a sanguinary war and the Fourteenth Amendment (as now
interpreted) to overcome the Court's blunder.
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Perceptive observers since at least the time of Thomas Jefferson
have known that the Constitution, as Jefferson testily put it, is "merely
a thing of wax," which the Court "may twist and shape into any form
they please."75 Judge Learned Hand called the words of the litigable
parts of the Constitution "empty vessels into which [a judge] can pour
nearly anything he will."76 And Chief Justice Warren, in a candid vale-
dictory, stated: "We, of course, venerate the past, but our focus is on
the problems of the day and the future as far as we can foresee it."77
The Court, he said, had the awesome responsibility of often speaking
the last word "in great governmental affairs."78 He went on: "It is a
responsibility that is made more difficult in this Court because we have
no constituency. We serve no majority. We serve no minority. We serve
only the public interest as we see it, guided only by the Constitution
"179and our own consciences ....
Jefferson, Hand and Warren were surely correct. But that does not
tell us, and additionally does not tell judges, how they are to search
their "own consciences" and pour content into the "empty vessels" of
the Constitution. A beginning may be made in a greater understanding
by restating what should be obvious but is not-that the Supreme
Court is not to be equated with any ordinary court of law. The issues
that come before it in constitutional cases depend upon the determina-
tion of many types of facts, their consequences and the values Ameri-
cans place on those consequences. They are questions of economics and
politics and of social policy. Legal training cannot solve them unless
law includes all social knowledge. It is, at the very least, "a very special
kind of court."80 Justice Cardozo admitted that his long experience on
the New York Court of Appeals did little to prepare him for his duties
on the Supreme Court;S and Justice Frankfurter maintained that Car-
75. 15 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 278 (A. Libscomb & A. Burgh eds. 1904-
07), quoted in L. LEVY, AGAINST THE LAW: THE NIXON COURT AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 31,
447 n.88 (1974) [hereinafter cited as LEY].
76. Quotation from Learned Hand, quoted in THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY: PAPERS AND
ADDRESSES OF LEARNED HAND 81 (I. Dilliard, ed. 1953) [hereinafter cited as SPIRIT OF
LIBERTY].
77. Retirement Address by Chief Justice Warren, Supreme Court of the United States
(June 23, 1969), reprinted in 395 U.S. X-XII.
78. Id at XI.
79. Id at XI.
80. Frankfurter, The Supreme Court in the Mirror of Justices, 105 U. PA. L. REv. 781,
785 (1957).
81. "It [The New York Court of Appeals] is a great common law court; its problems are
lawyers' problems. But the Supreme Court is occupied chiefly with statutory construction
... and with politics." Statement by Justice Cardozo, quotedin R. JACKSON, THE SUPREME
COURT IN THE AMERICAN SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT 54 (1955).
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dozo's classic study, The Nature of the Judicial Process, did not help
him (Frankfurter) in making decisions.82
Constitutional decisions, furthermore, do not follow logically from
the constitutional text. Only by a transparent fiction can, for example,
answers to problems of separation of powers be deduced from the si-
lences of articles I, II and III. This is also the case with problems of
federalism; in the words of Morris R. Cohen: "In a changing society the
relations between the states and the nation are essentially political, i.e.,
determined on the grounds of social policy, and. . .only by an intellec-
tually indefensible fiction can they be deduced from a written docu-
ment such as our Federal Constitution." 3 The proper discharge of the
judicial function depends not on conceptualized formulae or a bootless
search for the intentions of the Framers, but on the "correct apprecia-
tion of social conditions and a true appraisal of the actual effects of
conduct.
' '84
The Constitution is therefore an appeal to the decency and wis-
dom of those with whom the responsibility for its enforcement rests.8 5
Constitutional law is, generally speaking, the statement of the nation's
deepest feelings writ large and publicly. There should be small wonder,
then, that at times the Justices stumble. The adversary system, a heri-
tage from feudal days before public law became dominant, is simply
not up to the task of providing judges with the data relevant to deci-
sion-with the social conditions, with the actual effects of conduct and
with insight into what is decent and wise.86 Nothing-or very little-in
legal education or the practice of law prepares a judge for the task of
constitutional interpretation. As he so often did, Learned Hand stated
the needs of a constitutional judge better than anyone else:
I venture to believe that it is as important to a judge called upon
to pass on a question of constitutional law, to have at least a bow-
ing acquaintance with Acton and Maitland, with Thucydides,
Gibbon and Carlyle, with Homer, Dante, Shakespeare, and
Milton, with Machiavelli, Montaigne and Rabelais, with Plato,
Bacon, Hume and Kant, as with the books which have been spe-
cifically written upon the subject. For in such matters everything
turns upon the spirit in which he approaches the questions before
him. The words he must construe are empty vessels into which he
82. Frankfurter, The Supreme Court in the Mirror of Justices, 105 U. PA. L. REv. 781,
786 (1957).
83. M. COHEN, AMERICAN THOUGHT: A CRITICAL SKETCH 169 (1954).
84. R. JACKSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL SUPREMACY 44 (1941).
85. See F. COHEN, THE LEGAL CONSCIENCE at 10 n.15 (L. Cohen ed. 1960); A. PEKE-
LIS, LAW AND SOCIAL ACTION 1-41 (M. Konvitz ed. 1950).
86. See Miller & Barron, supra note 63.
[Vol. 6:487
ELUSIVE SEARCH FOR VALUES
can pour nearly anything he will. Men do not gather figs of this-
ties, nor supple institutions from judges whose outlook is limited
by parish or class. They must be aware of the changing social
tensions in every society which make it an organism; which de-
mand new schemata of adaptation; which will disrupt it, if rigidly
confined. 7
We should study carefully these profound words of a very wise judge.
We should realize that reliance on a formula or a dogma is intellectual
death. Our judges should be cautioned not to roam at will, acting like a
Muslim kadi under a tree;"8 but of equal importance, they should not
be rigidly confined in a strait jacket. Their discretion is in fact limited
to that which the public will accept.89 Judges know this; and they gen-
erally act accordingly. They do not always do so, to be sure, as Dred
Scott90 and the Pollock 9 cases reveal, but they usually follow this pat-
tern. Even Judge Frank Johnson's extraordinary mental hospital92 and
prison cases93 have not been overruled, either by appellate courts or in
87. SPIRIT OF LIBERTY, supra note 76, at 81.
88. Berger states that "intellectual honesty" demands that the "original understanding"
be honored across the board-and that less would be "to reduce 'law' to the will of a kadi."
GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at 411.
89. See MILLER, THE SUPREME COURT, supra note 50, at ch. 1.
90. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857), discussedat note 74 supra.
91. Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895), held invalid a national
income tax applied to income from state bonds. The Sixteenth Amendment was added in
1913 to constitutionalize the income tax. Just as Dred Scott was reversed by means of the
Civil War Amendments, so too was Pollock relegated to history by the Sixteenth
Amendment.
92. Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 387 (M.D. Ala. 1972); aft'd sub. nom. Wyatt v.
Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974). Wyatt held that an Alabama state facility designed
to habilitate the mentally retarded was being operated in an unconstitutional fashion be-
cause plaintiff was denied treatment. 344 F. Supp. at 395. The court held that under the
Constitution, minimum standards for care and training were mandated, the lack of operat-
ing funds for which constituted no justification for the failure to provide such services. Id at
392. The opinion virtually ordered the Alabama state legislature to appropriate funds; in
app. A, the court sets forth detailed "Minimum Constitutional Standards for Adequate
Treatment of the Mentally Retarded." Id at 395-407.
93. Pugh v. Locke, 406 F. Supp. 318 (M.D. Ala. 1976), ar'd in part, rev'd in part, and
remanded sub. nom. Newman v. Alabama, 559 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1977). In Pugh, class ac-
tions filed by inmates of Alabama penal institutions sought declaratory and injunctive relief,
alleging deprivation of their Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The court held that
conditions of confinement in Alabama penal institutions constituted cruel and unusual pun-
ishment where they bore no reasonable relationship to legitimate penal goals. Id at 328. An
order was issued to enjoin the state of Alabama from maintaining a prison system that was
not in compliance with constitutional requirements. The order was quite detailed, including
minimum constitutional standards for inmates, and the appointment of a Human Rights
Committee with supervisory powers. Id at 33 1. Most aspects of the judgment were upheld
by the 5th Circuit. Newman v. Alabama, 559 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1977).
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the court of public opinion. He had his radar finely tuned to what the
public would accept.
All judges, so we are told by Judge Braxton Craven of the Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, are "result oriented." 94 So is the public:
it cares for results and gives little, usually no, attention to the reasons
that judges state in their opinions. 9" Only the professoriate, some of
their students and a few members of the bar care to analyze the reason-
ing of the Justices in constitutional cases. We may not be pleased with
the extent to which the rationale of the Court escapes close examina-
tion, but it is a fact. "The public cares about results," says Professor
Leonard Levy, "and has little patience for reasons." 96 Levy and others
do not like that,97 but there is little or nothing that they can do about it.
There is no more reason to strive for an elegant/a juris in Supreme
Court decision-making than there is to expect or strive for cool ration-
ality in congressional decision-making. The governmental process sim-
ply does not work that way; quite possibly, no decision-making does. It
remains a harsh truth that after nearly two centuries of constitutional
adjudication, pathetically little is known about how the Justices reach
their decisions.98
One reason for our ignorance is the secrecy that envelops the
Court and its operations, a secrecy well-nigh impenetrable. We are told
that absolute secrecy is necessary for the effective functioning of the
Court. Whether that is so is, at the very least, open to question.99 But it
is not likely to change. We are not likely to learn more than the Justices
choose to tell us in their opinions and, after their deaths, in their col-
lected papers. Neither is enough. We are left with a tribunal which
speaks with the authority as well as the opacity of the Delphic Oracle.
If we ask, however, as we should, what results should be furthered
by the adjudicative process, we arrive at the core of the present inquiry.
A preliminary observation is in order: few would wish the Supreme
94. Craven, Paean to Pragmatism, 50 N. C. L. REv. 977, 977 (1972). The history of
American constitutional adjudication can and should be written around the theme of the
Supreme court being result-oriented. See Miller, Judicial Activism and American Constita-
tionalism: Some Notes and Reflections, NoMos XX: Constitutionalism 333 (J. Pennock & J.
Chapman eds. 1979).
95. See Miller & Scheflin, supra note 50, at 524.
96. LEvy, supra note 75, at xiv.
97. See id at xiii-xiv. See also Griswold, Of Time and Attitudes: Professor Hart and
Judge Arnold, 74 HARV. L. REV. 81 (1960).
98. See F. FRANKFURTER, OF LAW AND MEN 32 (P. Elman ed. 1956); Traynor, Bad-
lands in an Appellate Judge's Realm o/Reason, 7 UTAH L. REV. 157 (1960).
99. See Miller & Sastri, Secrecy and the Supreme Court: On the Needfor Piercing the
Red Velour Curtain, 22 BUFFALO L. Rnv. 799 (1973).
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Court to reach "a just result merely because of its identification with
underdog litigants like radicals, aliens, Negroes, the poor, and criminal
defendants who have been victimized by suppression.' 'l °° Similarly,
most thoughtful people would eschew results reached because the Jus-
tices are obviously biased toward the interests of some more powerful
groups in American society-for example, the corporations, the unions
or the press. However, it should be remembered by those who would
criticize the Warren Court for its "result orientation" (favoring the dis-
advantaged) that the Burger Court is also result oriented (toward the
protection of property), 0 I in some respects reflecting a posture not dis-
similar to the Court of the 1886-1936 era. These critics should also re-
member that Justice Miller once remarked:
It is vain to contend with judges who have been at the bar as
advocates for forty years of railroad companies, and all the forms
of associated capital, when they are called upon to decide cases
where such interests are in contest. All their training, all their
feelings are from the start in favor of those who need no such
influence.1
0 2
We should also keep in mind that judges are human and subject ac-
cordingly to the shortcomings of human nature. Their decisions are re-
flections of their personal philosophies, as President Theodore
Roosevelt once said. 0 3 Lawyers, of course, know this, for they often go
"judge-shopping," as Justice Douglas observed in the Chandler
case.l°4 Finally, judges, are invariably taken from the Establishment,
and they perceive their function as buttressing the stability of the sys-
tem of government in which they operate and as protecting that system
from all except minor and relatively insignificant efforts to change it. 10 5
The Justices are not a group of impervious legal technicians above and
beyond the political struggle. They participate in that struggle, al-
though the pretense is otherwise, and, indeed, as Richard Kluger
demonstrated in his classic study of Brown v. Board of Education, at
100. LEvy, supra note 75, at xiii.
101. See, e.g., Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976); Miami Herald Publishing Co. v.
Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974). Tornillo, a First Amendment decision, also involved the right
to control private property.
102. Statement of Justice Miller, quoted in C. FAIRMAN, MR. JUSTICE MILLER AND THE
SUPREME COURT 374 (1939).
103. See M. COHEN, AMERICAN THOUGHT: A CRITICAL SKETCH 163 (1954).
104. Chandler v. Judicial Council of the Tenth Circuit, 398 U.S. 74, 137 (1970) (Douglas,
J., dissenting).
105. See J. GRIFFITH, THE POLITICS OF THE JUDICIARY (1977); Miller, The Politics ofthe
4merican Judiciary, 49 POL. Q. 200 (1978).
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times are the object of pressure group tactics.1
0 6
Raoul Berger is not alone in expressing a critical view of the
Supreme Court's decisionmaking; his contribution must now be put
into perspective. Perhaps it was the dawning realization that judges in-
deed are human and that the Blackstone theory of the judicial process
is not accurate, which contributed to efforts either to constrain the
Supreme Court or to have the Justices achieve a higher intellectual
standard in their opinions. Whatever the reasons, and no doubt they
are multiple, the Court in recent decades has been attacked, subtly and
not so subtly, by commentators of various persuasions.
No clear beginning can be found for such attacks, although they
surely go back at least as far as Thomas Jefferson.I0 7 However, another
book entitled Government by Judiciary, 108 a two-volume work written
by Louis Boudin, is a useful starting point. That study was a frontal
assault on the Court's economic policy decisions, such as Lochner v.
New York'0 9 and other substantive due process decisions. The Court
operated as an "authoritative faculty of political economy""' for the
period of roughly 1886 to 1936-not always, to be sure, for there were
some aberrations-but enough so that monetary policy, for example,
could be resolved by a lawsuit between private parties that involved the
sum of $15.60.1" The abrupt shift in the composition of the Court in
1937 and succeeding years meant that the court had to find a new role,
which it did in civil rights and civil liberties cases. Economic substan-
tive due process gave way to innovative applications of the equal pro-
tection clause. The technique remained the same, although the
appellation and the ends served altered drastically. No longer a faculty
of political economy, the Justices on the post-1937 Court set themselves
up as an authoritative faculty of social ethics.
Opposition to this trend soon emerged, beginning in the late 1940s
and peaking in the 1950s with two Holmes Lectures at Harvard Uni-
106. R. KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BRowN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION
AND BLACK AMERICA'S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY (1976).
107. See note 75 and accompanying text supra.
108. L. BOUDIN, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY (1932).
109. 198 U.S. 45 (1905). Lochner invalidated a New York statute forbidding employment
in a bakery for more than 60 hours a week or 10 hours a day on basis that it impermissibly
interfered with the right to contract between employer and employee and also denied liberty
under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
I10. J. COMMONS, LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF CAPITALISM 7 (1924).
111. Norman v. B. & 0. R.R., 294 U.S. 240 (1935). See R. JACKSON. THE STRUGGLE FOR
JUDICIAL SUPREMACY (1941) for an account of how astonished some Europeans were that
national monetary policy could be settled in a lawsuit between private litigants decided by
lawyer-judges. Those days are gone forever.
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versity: Learned Hand's The Bill of Rights112 and Herbert Wechsler's
Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law. 3 Hand's main thrust
was judicial abnegation; he preferred that the Court defer, save in ex-
ceptional and clear cases, to the political branches of government. Per-
haps appalled by the idea that the Constitution, as Jefferson said, is "a
thing of wax,""' 4 Hand hewed stoutly to the notion that Holmes and
Frankfurter espoused-judicial self-restraint.
Professor Wechsler's position, which in some respects was a reply
to and refutation of Hand, is somewhat different. He sought constitu-
tional values in well-written opinions, in what essentially is a procedu-
ral viewpoint. He, and others such as Professor Henry Hart 1 5 and
Dean Erwin Griswold," 6 admonished the Justices to make decisions in
accordance with "neutral" or "impersonal" principles or "the law as it
has been received and understood."' 7 To them, as to Aristotle, law is
Reason unaffected by desire. The word "reason" is capitalized because
to them it is the neplus ultra of constitutional adjudication."' To the
extent that the Wechsler position is a procedural concept, it offers little
help to judges who must often choose between conflicting constitu-
tional vales. Put another way, the deliberation is about means and
presupposes that the problem of ends has been settled. But that prob-
lem-of ends, of goals, of purposes-is precisely what is not settled in
constitutional adjudication. Professor Wechsler's clarion call is not suf-
ficient to meet that need.
What, then, is required? In highest level abstraction, the need is for
a teleological jurisprudence, one goal-seeking and purposive in nature.
Judicial thought should ultimately be in terms of consequences, of re-
sults and of alternative decisions. This is not a bald-faced plea for re-
sults in accordance with who the litigants are. The task of the Court is
to further the democratic ideal. Emphatically, it is not to search for
112. L. HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS (1958).
113. 73 HARV. L. RaV. 1 (1959).
114. See note 75 and accompanying text supra.
115. Hart, The Time Chart of the Justices, 73 HARV. L. REv. 84 (1959).
116. Griswold, Of Time and Attltudes- Professor Hart and Judge Arnold, 74 HARV. L.
Rav. 81 (1960).
117. Wechsler, supra note 113 at 15.
118. It is appropriate to note that none of these observers, nor any who adhere to their
views, have ever analyzed the concept of Reason as used in adjudication. The fact is that
choices among competing values are unavoidable; judicial non-neutrality is pervasive in
Supreme Court opinions. Constitutional adjudication since 1789 has been purposive in na-
ture, beginning with the groundwork laid by Chief Justice John Marshall. See Miller &
Howell, The Myth of Neutraliy in ConstitutionalAdjudication, 27 U. Cm. L. REv. 661, 671
(1960), reprinted in MILLER, THE SUPREME COURT, supra note 50, at ch. 3.
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intentions, save only as those intentions are relevant to that mission; we
cannot ignore the past, of course, but it need not imprison us. In this
era of the most rapid social change in the history of mankind, more-
over, neither the present nor the future are mere extensions of the
past."i9 Public policy in general, and that enunciated by the Supreme
Court in particular, must be forward looking.
Something more than the pragmatic temper regnant is the require-
ment. Judicial pragmatism is exemplified most obviously in the "bal-
ancing" approach so often employed in modem Supreme Court
opinions. 120 It was, to be sure, a major breakthrough from the arid and
sterile conceptualism previously used. But it is not enough: the trouble
with pragmatism is that it fails its own test-it does not work. "Mud-
dling through" may be observed throughout the governmental proc-
ess.1 21 This has sufficed in our system largely for reasons external to law
or to the Constitution; pragmatism was satisfactory for a nation in the
conditions of an empty continent, protected by two oceans and the Brit-
ish navy, and free from many of the problems that beset other nations.
With the Great Depression, the Second World War and the Cold War,
that situation has fundamentally changed. We must know what we
want and then try to get it. That includes knowing what we want from
the judges.
The "something more" that is needed has thus far received little
attention from constitutional scholars. Legal writing tends, in constitu-
tional and other matters, to be detailed analyses of judicial opinions,
with the writer often asserting that the judge was right but for the
wrong reasons, or vice versa.1 22 That is a narrow focus on theprocedure
of adjudication. No attention is paid to the substance, although not en-
tirely, to be sure; for example, Professor Wechsler approves the result
in Brown but cannot locate the neutral principle. 23 Berger also ap-
proves the result in Brown, but faults the Court for ignoring the inten-
119. For a recent discussion of this point, see H. BROWN, THE HUMAN FUTURE REVIS-
ITED (1978).
120. Note for example the balancing concept in First Amendment and commerce clause
cases. See, e.g., Elrod v. Bums, 427 U.S. 347 (1976) (discharge of non-civil service employee
Republicans by newly elected Democrat sheriff violates First and Fourteenth Amendments);
Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970) (Arizona's interest in quality control insuffi-
cient to require California dealer to build special packing plant in Arizona for Arizona-
grown cantaloupes).
121. See C. LINDBLOM, THE POLICY-MAKING PROCESS (1968).
122. See the articles in any issue of Sup. CT. REv., or almost any law journal article
discussing a Supreme Court opinion.
123. Wechsler, supra note 113, at 31-35.
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tions of the thirty-ninth Congress.
124
A few writers have tried to go beyond analyses of the reasoning of
opinions for internal consistencies or for adherence to such standards
as Wechsler and Berger proffer. These commentators admit, tacitly or
explicitly, the importance of reasoning, but maintain that the judicial
eye should be on the consequences of the Court's action. Representa-
tive examples of this genre include: a modernized theory of distributive
justice essayed by philosopher John Rawls; 25 Alexander Pekelis' call
for a 'jurisprudence of welfare;"' 2 6 Myres McDougal's appeal for a
"law of human dignity;" '1 27 and Felix Cohen's view that "the Good"
should be furthered. 2 ' These contributions illustrate the existence of a
very respectable body of scholarly thought of significance to analysis of
constitutional adjudication. Any book-length discussion of Government
by Judiciary is faulty to the extent these works and the issues they raise
are ignored. Berger does not mention them.
The overwhelming requirement is to search for and identify the
values that should be sought in constitutional adjudication, values that
go beyond mere procedure, as important as that is, and involve analysis
of the goals or purposes of the American constitutional order. That
such a search has been eschewed by most writers is not surprising. It
takes a different type of mind from that usually evident in the legal
profession. It takes the broad-gauged approach and knowledge out-
lined by Judge Hand. 29 Few have it, but we all need it. And it is the
task of legal educators, if not the bar as a whole, to move in that direc-
tion. It has been stated that:
No one-not even the most brilliant scientist alive today-really
knows where science is taking us. We are aboard a train which is
gathering speed, racing down a track on which there are an un-
known number of switches leading to unknown destinations. No
single scientist is in the engine cab and there may be demons at
the switch. Most of society is in the caboose looking backward. 3 '
The time has come for lawyers to get out of the caboose and try to do
some steering.
124. GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY, at 117-33 (ch. 7).
125. J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971). Rawls' book, written by a philosopher, not
a lawyer, is perhaps the best. Professor Ronald Dworkin in Taking Righis Seriously (1977)
agrees with Rawls' standpoint. Cf. I. NozicK, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA (1974).
126. See PEKELIS, LAW AND SOCIAL ACTION 1-41 (M. Konvitz ed. 1950).
127. McDougal, Perspectivesforan.InternationaiLawofHuman.Dignity, 1959 AM. Soc'Y
INT'L L. PROC. 107 (1959).
128. F. COHEN, ETHICAL SYSTEMS AND LEGAL IDEALS (1933).
129. See text accompanying note 87 supra.
130. R. LAPP, THE NEW PRIESTHOOD: THE SCIENTIFIC ELITE AND THE USES OF POWER
(1965). See also D. PRIcE, THE SCIENTIFIC ESTATE (1965).
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HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
If they do so, then one of the first tasks to be undertaken is a thor-
ough analysis and evaluation of the adversary system as a means of
setting public policy. It is faulty on at least three scores-the compe-
tence of the personnel, an inability to know the consequences of alter-
native decisions and the flow of information to the judges.131 The
principal problem is that the system itself is inadequate to the need.
Conclusion
The Constitution is a politico-legal palimpsest. That it will remain
so is not to be doubted (barring, of course, catastrophe such as nuclear
war; in which case arguments over constitutionalism would be totally
irrelevant). 3 2 The gloss of nearly two centuries of constitutional devel-
opment will not-and cannot-be erased. We cannot return to the sta-
tus quo ante. Trying to read the minds of men long dead is not the way
to interpret the Constitution, for it is a document always in a state of
becoming. It must suit the aspirations of each generation of Americans.
If it does not do so, it will be discarded. Only through growth without
amendment has it-the original text--endured as the fundamental law.
That does not mean that each interpretation, by the judiciary or
others, need be or will be accepted by the American people. The Jus-
tices know that; they are fully aware of the fact that they are a political
institution which cannot proceed too far ahead of the main currents of
American thought. The overall pattern of constitutional law reflects
both what the nation needs and what it will abide by.
The needs of scholarship are manifest and in large part unfulfilled.
The adversary system does require systematic and comprehensive reex-
amination and evaluation. Substantive goals that fit a rapidly changing
society must be developed-and applied. To the extent that Raoul Ber-
ger forces lawyers and others to reexamine their premises and basic
beliefs, his book serves a worthy purpose. The pity is that his "solution"
is no solution at all. One does not have to be clairvoyant to predict that
Government by Judiciary will convince only those already convinced,
and that it will have little or no effect upon the course of constitutional
interpretation.1 33 His call for "hard-nosed legal interpretation" does
131. See text accompanying note 86 supra. For further discussion, see Miller & Barron,
supra note 63.
132. "The possibility of all-out thermonuclear war is the most serious danger confronting
industrial civilization today." H. BROWN, THE HUMAN FUTURE REVISITED 180 (1978).
133. It is likely that the late Professor Alexander Bickel will continue to have a demon-
strable influence on those who write about the Constitution, at least to the extent that his
writings are cited by commentators and judges. See, e.g., A. BIcKEL, THE MORALrrY OF
CONSENT (1975). Not that I always agree with him; I often do not. The point is that his
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not fit the facts of constitutional development-neither in the past, nor
in the present and surely not in the future.
criticism of the Warren Court in, for example, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF
PROGRESS (1970), is faulty as is the criticism of Professor Wechsler; it is, in the final analysis,
a demand for "right" or "correct" procedure and adherence to the "passive virtues," at a
time when it is substance as much as procedure that is required. See Wright, Professor Bick-
el, The Scholarly Tradition, and the Supreme Court, 84 HARV. L. REv. 769 (1971), in which
Judge Wright remarks that Bickel "aspires to a neutral, scientific viewpoint; he seeks to
demonstrate that the clash between himself and the Warren Court is not one of conflicting
value choices, but of fundamental method. . . . [The] fundamental dispute [is] over the
good society as well as over judicial method." Id at 803. It appears that Judge Wright is
correct. His essay, along with others such as Levinson, supra note 11, is an accurate and
insightful perception of the realities of constitutional adjudication.
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